Analysis of manning options for Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure teams by Newbold, Elizabeth A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-06
Analysis of manning options for Visit, Board, Search,
and Seizure teams
Newbold, Elizabeth A.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
ANALYSIS OF MANNING OPTIONS FOR VISIT, BOARD, 








Thesis Advisor:  William Hatch  
Co-Advisor: Aruna Apte 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
ANALYSIS OF MANNING OPTIONS FOR VISIT, BOARD, SEARCH, AND 
SEIZURE TEAMS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Elizabeth A. Newbold 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This research explores the viability of qualifying and manning Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) teams with 
Marine infantrymen from the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that are deployed with amphibious readiness groups. 
The VBSS element is an area that needs to be certified for surface combatants before deployment, and is required 
according to the Required Operational Capabilities, Projected Operational Environment, but it consumes time, 
material, and personnel from multi-mission naval ships. The sailors who execute VBSS do so as collateral duty, and 
the missions are considered evolutions (temporarily manned watch stations). This results in VBSS teams that are 
insufficiently trained and not performing the mission as described in the Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 3–
07–11M Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). The author used an analytical approach that the Combined 
Maritime Forces could use to assign Marine VBSS teams to ships tasked with MIO. The findings of this research 
recommend the elimination of sailors in the execution of Required Operational Capabilities element Missions of State 






14. SUBJECT TERMS  
VBSS, visit, board, search, and seizure, boarding party, maritime interdiction operations, MIO, 
maritime raid force, MRF, Marine Expeditionary Units, MEU, Marine VBSS 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
69 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Elizabeth A. Newbold 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2007 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
























Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 




This research explores the viability of qualifying and manning Visit, Board, Search, and 
Seizure (VBSS) teams with Marine infantrymen from the Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) that are deployed with amphibious readiness groups. The VBSS element is an 
area that needs to be certified for surface combatants before deployment, and is required 
according to the Required Operational Capabilities, Projected Operational Environment, 
but it consumes time, material, and personnel from multi-mission naval ships. The sailors 
who execute VBSS do so as collateral duty, and the missions are considered evolutions 
(temporarily manned watch stations). This results in VBSS teams that are insufficiently 
trained and not performing the mission as described in the Navy Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures 3–07–11M Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). The author used an 
analytical approach that the Combined Maritime Forces could use to assign Marine 
VBSS teams to ships tasked with MIO. The findings of this research recommend the 
elimination of sailors in the execution of Required Operational Capabilities element 
Missions of State 4.4 (VBSS mission). It is further recommended to use MEU Marines to 
execute the VBSS mission onboard surface combatants. 
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Traditional missions of cruisers and destroyers are air warfare, surface warfare, 
and antisubmarine warfare, but in fact, Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) as part 
of the primary missions of state (MOS) warfare area is accomplished more frequently 
than most other missions. In today’s Navy of billion dollar, multi-mission platforms, 
VBSS does not clearly stand out at the top of the priority list for manning, training, and 
equipping.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Despite a vast international effort, piracy is still a major problem for commercial 
shipping (Millen, 2014). Consequently, the demand for the VBSS mission remains very 
high in the regional hotspots of the world. A shipmaster working with Dryad Maritime 
reported that only 25% of commercial ships took advantage of the benefits of basic 
physical and visual deterrents during transits through the Gulf of Aden (Edey, 2014). By 
2008, the insurance cost to transit through the Gulf of Aden was USD 20,000 for each 
commercial ship (Valencia & Khalid, 2009). In 2014 alone, there were 10 attacks by 
pirates in the Maritime Security Patrol Area for the Combined Maritime Force (CMF), 
which is an area of high military activity; therefore, using VBSS could have reduced the 
occurrence of these pirate attacks. VBSS missions are the primary source for deterring 
and defeating piracy and drug trafficking, and CMF reports that only an estimated 4.5% 
of heroin produced in Afghanistan to fund terrorism was interdicted in 2014 (Command 
Maritime Forces [CMF] Overview, n.d).  
Even though piracy is an issue in the CMF area of responsibility (AOR), it is not 
the only issue. An antiterrorism program manager for the Center for Security Forces 
noted, “Although antipiracy operations are getting significant news coverage, VBSS 
teams are not specifically trained for an antipiracy mission” (Barker, 2009). This occurs 
because CMF is responsible for antiterrorism as well, which can span many different 
types of VBSS boardings. 
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1. Problem 
Although the demand remains high for these specialized teams, the priority that 
the Navy places on manning, training, and equipping them is low in relation to the other 
primary mission areas. The program itself is not the problem, the amount of piracy events 
that have taken place where VBSS tactics have been employed have declined, in 2013 
there were no ships that were successfully hijacked (“Somali Pirates Driven Off in First 
Attack,” 2014).   
Ships are required to maintain two VBSS teams, each consisting of six sailors and 
two alternates, who perform the VBSS function as collateral duty. Maintaining the status 
quo on board each deployable Navy ship leads to degradation in the mission area because 
of the higher levels of emphasis placed on different mission areas for training. Only 5.1% 
of sailors on VBSS teams reported that they were able to participate in VBSS training on 
a regular basis, but more than 80% of sailors participated in the actual VBSS operations 
(Ray, 2010). 
The Center for Security Forces that trains the Navy’s VBSS teams, reports above-
average failure rates at the San Diego, CA, and the Chesapeake, VA, training centers 
(Table 1). The attrition rates have recently begun to decline because the curriculum at 
each training center has changed and requirements have been relaxed. The new 
requirements include less physical training and more technical training (T. Sanderlin, 
personal communication, February 23, 2015). 
 
 Chesapeake, VA San Diego, CA 
FY 2011 16.9% 36.3% 
FY 2012 16.2% 16.3% 
FY 2013 13.4% 16.3% 
FY 2014 12.8% 24.99% 
Table 1.    Fiscal Year (FY) Attrition Rates for East and West Coast VBSS 
Schools (Sanderlin, 2015) 
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As a former training officer, I have personally gone through the process of 
manning, training, equipping, and certifying two different VBSS teams. This process 
takes time and effort from the entire ship’s company. The commanding and executive 
officers have to be involved from the beginning to stress the importance of identifying 
adequate personnel. The weight of their positions ensures junior officers tasked to build 
the team to direct higher ranking department heads to make the difficult decisions on 
manning the teams and giving up valuable time to conduct training. The department 
heads must find personnel that not only meet the physical fitness, weapons qualification, 
and swimming requirements, but they must also give up that person for an unforeseen 
time during the certification phases, work-up cycle, and deployment. Division officers 
must then manage their divisions and maintain their equipment with fewer people during 
the 9-week training for each member to become fully certified in VBSS in addition to 
VBSS team training, VBSS certification, and actual VBSS operations. During training 
intervals, the work requirements of the VBSS personnel are assigned to other members of 
the division. 
2. Thesis Statement 
The VBSS mission is critical in the safety, security, and stability of the Middle 
Eastern region, but because the crews on multi-mission platforms have many other 
priorities, the investment of the necessary amount of time for VBSS training is less than 
optimal. Conversely, the Marine Corps’ priorities from the beginning of their training and 
throughout the entire pipeline more closely align with the combat-intensive nature of the 
VBSS warfare area.   
3. Benefits of this Study 
The outcome of this study demonstrates that transferring the VBSS mission to the 
Marine Corps is achievable, and that the Marines have the appropriately qualified 
personnel to support this mission. This more closely aligns the Marine Corps to their 
roots as directed in the Resolution of the Continental Congress on November 10, 1775: 
Resolved, that two Battalions of Marines be raised consisting of one 
Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, two Majors & Officers as usual in other 
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regiments, that they consist of an equal number of privates with other 
battalions; that particular care be taken that no persons be appointed to 
office or inlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so 
acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea, 
when required. 
Relieving the Navy of this boarding mission will better support the manning and training 
priorities onboard ships to be aligned with given instructions. These changes will allow 
commanding officers and crew to focus on readiness in all warfare areas.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
(1) What alternatives are available to conduct VBSS in the U.S. Navy? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
(1) What is the appropriate quantity and quality of Marine manpower to 
comprise a VBSS team? 
(2) How would an analytical approach efficiently allocate these Marine VBSS 
teams to ships that are assigned a VBSS mission? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The manpower and training requirements for Navy VBSS teams will be used to 
review and compare MOS, based on Navy and Marine Corps publications and 
instructions. An analytical approach will be developed to examine the capabilities and 
limitations of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Expeditionary Strike Group 
(ESG) afloat in the area of operations to refine the parameters of the analytical approach. 
In addition, an analytical assessment will answer research questions and show courses of 
action costs and benefits.  
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I is an introduction that will serve as background to the scope of the 
thesis. It will present the issue and benefits along with stating the research questions of 
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this thesis. Specifically, this section will state the importance of the VBSS mission and 
the problems with the current program.   
Chapter II will provide background on the VBSS mission area as well as the 
certification process. In particular, the certification process on cruisers and destroyers and 
the effect that this process has on the other warfare areas. It will also give background 
into the Marine Corps’ and the Navy’s training pipelines as a basis for explaining which 
service is more appropriately trained for VBSS from the beginning.  
Chapter III is a literature review that will summarize pertinent documentation for 
insights into the depth and magnitude of VBSS operations and give the best possible 
recommendations to improve it. Specifically, it will review other theses that have been 
expanded upon and used to substantiate this thesis. Also, this section will explain the 
instructions that were used to analyze the research questions.  
Chapter IV will present the requirements and development of the thesis analytical 
approach along with the actual approach. Solutions to the model and an explanation of 
the model results will be provided. 
Chapter V will provide a summary, conclusion, and recommendations based on 
the results of the literature review and the model. In conclusion, the strengths and 
weaknesses will be explored for three courses of action presented for further research.   
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1. Marine Training Pipeline—“Every Marine is, First and Foremost, a 
Rifleman”   
Every U.S. Marine begins boot camp training with performing drills, physical 
endurance exercises, field maneuvers, defensive driving, first aid, close combat skills, 
and, last but not least, marksmanship. After boot camp, Marines that are selected for the 
0300 occupational field, infantry, go to the Marine Corps School of Infantry. At this 
school, Marines learn combat marksmanship, patrolling, grenade usage, military 
operations in urban terrain, tactical formations, and continue to advance in the Marine 
Corps Martial Arts Program (“Recruit Training,” n.d.). About 1100 Infantry Marines 
make up the Ground Combat Element of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). 
In addition to the Marine Corps School of Infantry (SOI), Marines that are 
selected for special operations attend Marine Corps Special Operations School, 
Individual Training Course. During this intense training, candidates go through a four-
phase training that can be compared with what the Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Special 
Forces go through; currently, the Navy uses SEALs to conduct level IV, or hostile, 
boardings. The Marine Corps training, taken from the Marine Special Operations 
Command (MARSOC) website is as follows. 
Phase 1 – (Basic Skills) 10 Weeks: Phase 1 trains and evaluates students 
in the basic skill sets required of all special operators. Physical fitness, 
swimming and hand-to-hand combat are stressed in a physical training] 
program designed around endurance, functional fitness and amphibious 
training. This physical training program will continue throughout the 
course and has been designed to prepare the student for the unique 
demands of special operations. Field skills including: navigation, 
patrolling, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE), Tactical 
Combat Casualty Care (TCCC). Mission planning, Fire support training 
and Communications round out the first phase.  
Phase 2 – (Small Unit Tactics) 8 Weeks: Phase 2 builds upon the 
foundation of Phase 1, training the student in small boat and scout 
swimmer operations, crew served weapons, demolitions, photography and 
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information collection and reporting. Students will be evaluated in two 
Full Mission Profile exercises “Operation Raider Spirit,” a 2-week 
exercise focused on patrolling and combat operations, and “Operation 
Stingray Fury” focused on urban and rural reconnaissance.  
Phase 3 – (Close Quarters Battle) 5 Weeks: Student will be trained in rifle 
and pistol combat marksmanship and will then learn the tactics, techniques 
and procedures need to serve as a member of a Marine Special Operations 
Team during assault operations. This Phase culminates in a series of full 
mission profile precision raids on rural and urban objectives during 
“Operation Guile Strike.”  
Phase 4 – (Irregular Warfare) 7 Weeks: In the final phase, students will 
receive instruction on Irregular Warfare operations. The course culminates 
with “Operation Derna Bridge.” Derna Bridge will require the student to 
use all of the skills mastered throughout the course while training, 
advising and operating with a Partner Nation/Irregular force. Newly 
graduated MARSOF CSO’s will be assigned to one of the three Marine 
Special Operations Battalions. (“MARSOF Individual Training Course 
(ITC),” n.d.) 
2. Navy Training Pipeline—“Every Sailor is a Fire Fighter” 
The Navy’s 8-week boot camp centers on physical training and indoctrination to 
life onboard a ship, with battle stations, first aid, basic seamanship, and firefighting. Only 
1 week is dedicated to weapons training on the M-16 and 12-gauge shotgun (“Navy Boot 
Camp,” n.d.). After boot camp, most sailors continue onto their assigned technical school 
or advanced school (A school). Most A schools do not provide any further combat 
training, only technical training for each sailor to learn his or her own rate. 
Normally, the sailors will then transition to their assigned ship; once they arrive, 
there is a chance they could volunteer or be selected for the VBSS team. Selection is 
usually based on physical fitness because the prerequisites are mostly centered on the 
physical readiness test, swim qualifications, and the ability to climb a 30-foot Jacob’s 
ladder in full gear. Once selected for the team, they attend Security Reaction Force 
(SRF)-Basic (SRF-B) School, which has recently transitioned from being taught in an 
actual school to an onboard ship training that occurs during orientation. The next two 
schools are taught in accordance with Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
(OPNAVINST) 3591.1F by the Center for Security Forces (CENSECFOR). The first 
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course is SRF-Advanced (SRF-A), which is more in-depth shipboard, pier, or small boat 
combat training. Then they are enrolled in Non-Compliant Boarding, Visit, Boarding, 
Search, and Seizure (NCB-VBSS), which covers compliant and noncompliant boardings, 
more tactical weapons training, ladder climbing, rappelling and containerized inspection, 
tactical maneuvers, intelligence gathering, nonlethal weapons, mission planning, effective 
communications, combat first aid, and prisoner escort. This is the final school for a VBSS 
team member, but every VBSS team must have a boarding officer who must attend 
boarding officer VBSS School. This school is before NCB-VBSS and is normally 
reserved for service members ranked Chief Petty Officers and above. Last is the 
mechanical breacher VBSS. This school is for sailors from the engineering department 
and teaches them how to breach a variety of doors or walls.  
A full curriculum description given in the Appendix shows that this VBSS 
training is more closely aligned with the training that an Infantry Marine receives 
throughout his or her career. As stated previously, the Center for Security Forces has had 
to relax its standards and reduce the amount of physical training to decrease attrition 
rates, which may lead to ability degradation in VBSS teams.   
The Navy defines special skills and abilities for enlisted occupations using a 
system of ratings. Each sailor trains toward a specific rating and additional VBSS training 
is not a part of a normal training pipeline for any of the Navy ratings. In order to attend 
these schools, it requires up to 9 weeks of additional non-in-rate training. During this 
time, the sailor is pulled from their watch section and daily duties. Because their work 
still needs to be accomplished, other personnel from the ships force must complete it in 
addition to their own duties. There are dozens of other critical schools for other warfare 
areas that must be attended, and most of these are part of sailors’ training pipeline for 
their rate, but VBSS schools compound the manpower loss.  
3. Manning Issues 
In 2002, the Navy standard workweek was changed from 67 hours of work per 
week to 70 (Ewing, 2008). This meant that the same amount of work would be done on 
each ship with fewer personnel. This change in complement with optimal manning, 
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although technically discontinued, it is still the standard by which requirements are 
determined for ships and how they are manned today. There are 325,000 active duty 
members in the U.S. Navy as of 2015 (“Status of the Navy,” n.d.), and the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review calls for even further reductions in manning to 323,000 
active duty personnel (Hagel, 2014). 
In this reduced manning environment, every person on the ship is critical, and 
most have a critical Navy enlisted classification (NEC); moreover, some sailors are the 
only one aboard to hold a specific critical NEC. On a condition III (wartime/increased 
tension/forward deployed cruising readiness) watch bill, each watch station is accounted 
for and manned continuously. Ships are expected to maintain a condition III level of 
readiness for 60 days while making sure each sailor gets 8 hours of sleep every day. 
Because sleep is a requirement, each watch station may require three to four people to 
man it. The minimal manning for a VBSS team is two teams of six members; at any time, 
the ship could be ordered to conduct a boarding, and six specific people from the watch 
bill will need to be replaced by other qualified watch standers to conduct that evolution. 
This not only interrupts the continuity of that watch station, it potentially interrupts the 
sleeping, eating, or training routines of other watch standers. VBSS is different from the 
other shipboard evolutions such as flight quarters, because flight quarters is normally 
planned out at least a day in advance and does not require the sailors to leave the ship. 
VBSS operations can be ordered sporadically and take much more time to complete then 
other shipboard evolutions. 
B. REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES, PROJECTED 
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. Overview  
The Required Operational Capabilities, Projected Operational Environment (ROC 
POE), OPNAV 3501.101E delineates primary and secondary missions for each platform. 
Because each platform has a unique ROC POE, the instructions for a destroyer (DDG) 
and cruiser (CG) will be referenced because they are more often assigned VBSS 
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missions. In addition, DDGs and CGs do not have Marines already embarked for 
deployments.   
2. Mission Areas  
Mission areas are capabilities that a specific ship was designed for and maintains, 
for example on a DDG-51 class Anti-Air Warfare and is assigned a P to delineate it as a 
primary warfare area. The Missions of State (MOS) warfare area is a primary warfare 
area and VBSS falls under it as a required operational capability, but there are also nine 
other primary warfare areas as shown in Figure 1. Manpower requirements for each ship 
are determined from the tasking given by all mission areas in a measurable amount of 
productive work (Guillory, 2003).   
 
 
AAW: Anti-Air Warfare 
AMW: Amphibious Warfare 
ASU: Anti-Surface Ship Warfare 
ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare 
CCC: Command, Control, and 
Communications 
C2W: Command and Control Warfare and 
Information Warfare 
FSO: Fleet Support Operations 
INT: Intelligence 
LOG: Logistics 
MIW: Mine Warfare 
MOB: Mobility 
MOS: Missions of State 
NCO: Non-Combat Operations 
STW: Strike Warfare 
 
Figure 1.  Primary and Secondary Warfare Mission Areas for DDG 51 Class 
(Guillory, 2003) 
A more current ROC POE from the CG-47 Ticonderoga Class has some of the 
warfare areas reorganized with the most up-to-date nomenclature, but MOS is still a 
primary warfare area and VBSS is still listed under it (Figure 2). This shows that between 
2003, when the DDG-51 ROC POE instruction was promulgated, and 2014, when the 
CG-47 ROC POE came out, there has been no change to the requirements placed on the 




AW: Air Warfare 
AMW: Amphibious Warfare 
ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare 
CCC: Command, Control, and 
Communications 
FHP: Force Health Protection 
FSO: Fleet Ship Operations 
INT: Intelligence Operation 
 
IO: Information Operations 
LOG: Logistics 
MIW: Mine Warfare 
MOB: Mobility 
MOS: Missions of State 
NCO: Non-Combat Operations 
STW: Strike Warfare 
SUW: Surface Warfare 
 
Note: Warfare area nomenclature was updated in the latest DDG-51 ROC POE as well, 
and coincides with the CG-47 warfare areas.  
Figure 2.  Primary and Secondary Warfare Mission Areas for CG 47 Class 
(Fanta, 2014) 
C. FLEET REPLACEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM 
1. Overview  
Every Navy ship goes through a cycle called the Fleet Replacement Training 
Program (FRTP) in accordance with Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific 
(COMNAVSURFPAC)/Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic 
(COMNAVSURFLANT) instruction 3502.3, Surface Force Readiness Manual. During 
this cycle, each mission area as assigned in the ROC POE is assessed for certification to 
deploy.   
2. Phases 
The cycle consists of five phases that continually repeat over a 27-month period. 
The cycle starts with the basic phase: all of the training, assessing, and certifying for 
individual ships happens during this phase and is broken into two tiers. Next are the 
integrated and advanced phases, in which group level training, assessing, and certifying 
take place. Once these three phases are complete, the sustainment phase starts, and 
includes deployment. During the sustainment phase, the ship’s crew is expected to 
maintain proficiency and begin planning for the next basic phase. After the ship returns 
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from deployment, the fifth phase—maintenance—begins and the whole process starts 
over shown in Figure 3 (Thomas & Hunt, 2012).   
 
Figure 3.  Fleet Replacement Training Plan (FRTP) Notional Schedule in 
Months (Thomas & Hunt, 2012) 
D. OPERATIONS 
1. Combined Maritime Forces 
The area of operations for CMF spans more than 2.4 million square nautical miles 
(nm) of international waters that borders 18 countries and contains three strategic choke 
points: the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al Mandeb, and the Suez Canal. CTF 150 specifically 
operates in a 450 nm span called the Maritime Security Patrol Area (Figure 4). More than 
$950 billion of trade passes through these choke points every year, with 33% of 
seaborne-traded oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) alone. This area of 
operations also contains more than 60% of the world’s crude oil and natural gas reserves 
and more than 30% of the world’s crude oil and natural gas production (Combined 
Maritime Forces). 
CMF is made up of three smaller task forces: Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, 
151, and 152. These task forces are made up of a coalition of up to 60 different countries, 
and each one has a unique mission. CTF 150 is for counterterrorism and specifically 
targets vessels that are trafficking narcotics in order to cut off funding to terrorist 
organizations. This CTF also conducts intelligence patrols, where VBSS teams board a 
variety of vessels to gain intelligence on terrorist activities. The mission of CTF 151 is 
counter-piracy. U.S. ships are normally not under the tactical control of CTF 151 unless a 
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piracy event is occurring. Last, CTF 152 is also concerned with counterterrorism, but 
specifically in the Arabian Gulf, and more specifically working to create interoperability 
with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).   
This thesis will concentrate on CTF 150 because it is the task force that U.S. ships 
are normally assigned to on a regular basis. They are also more extensively involved in 
day-to-day VBSS operations. CTF 150 was established in 2002 with a mission to, 
“Disrupt terrorist organizations and associated traffics by restricting their freedom of 
maneuver in the maritime environment.” This task force mainly disrupts terrorism by 
interdicting vessels carrying drugs. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
figures show that Afghanistan alone produces about 460,000 kg of heroin and hashish 
every year, and in 2014, CTF 150 seized more than 21,000 kg of these drugs, which 
equates to about $54 million (Figure from a PBS special report was $2,600/kilo) (CMF 
Overview, n.d.).      
 
Figure 4.  CTF 150 Maritime Security Patrol Area East and Westbound Routes 
(Combined Maritime Forces) 
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2. Marine Expeditionary Units Requirements  
The Marines deploy as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which consists of a 
ground, aviation, and logistics combat element. The ground combat element has three 
rifle companies and one weapons platoon, which is about 1200 Marines.    
There is much less documentation to dictate the day-to-day workload for the 
Marines while they are deployed with the MEU. Specifically looking at the duties of the 
infantrymen, their main job is to maintain the equipment onboard as well as their combat 
skills. They are also required to maintain a 6-hour response time—“flash to bang”—
meaning once an operational capability is required, the MEU has 6 hours to execute a 
response.  
Space onboard a deployed ship is in high commodity, and Marines must find 
space to conduct their close combat training and martial arts programs. Aside from 
maintaining their skillset, there are no other requirements for the Marines to perform 
aboard a ship. The actions carried out in each VBSS boarding contributes toward 
maintaining these required skills. 
3. Expeditionary Strike Group 
ESGs normally deploy with three amphibious ships, the landing helicopter assault 
ship or the landing helicopter dock ship, a landing platform dock ship, and a dock landing 
ship. The Landing helicopter assault ship or landing helicopter dock ship has a large deck 
(or aircraft carrier) component that carries most of the aircraft, which includes an 
estimated load out of 12 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters and four CH-53 Sea Stallion 
helicopters. The range of a CH-46 is about 600 nm and has a capacity of 24 troops with 
their gear; the CH-53 has a range of about 540 nm and can carry 38 troops with their 
gear. The CH-46 will be used to analyze the transport of the Marine VBSS teams 
(“Expeditionary Strike Group,” 2011).  
The concentration of an ESG deployment is to provide amphibious shore assault 
capabilities for contingency operations. ESGs are often very helpful in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) because of the high volume of transportation 
assets available.  
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4. Evolutions  
While underway, the personnel on the ship are assigned watch stations, which are 
delineated in a watch bill; these stations are to be manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
In addition to the underway watch stations, there are also special evolution watch bills, 
which are only enacted while that evolution is taking place. Evolutions are defined as 
being a temporarily manned watch station. The personnel that are used to man the special 
evolution stations are also on the regular watch bill, so while that special evolution is 
occurring, a replacement watch stander must be used. 
Each ship is responsible for constructing a unique underway watch bill; as a 
result, the effect of pulling members from watch stations to participate in a VBSS 
evolution is different for each ship. The one reoccurring issue is that the disruption 
caused by special evolutions takes away from the continuity of a watch station and the 
effectiveness of the watch stander. 
Also, VBSS is not the only evolution that these ships are required to perform—
other evolutions such as flight deck operations, well deck operations (for amphibious 
ships), and boat deck operations require qualified individuals, training, and execution. 
Some personnel are on multiple evolutions, such as VBSS, flight quarters, navigation 
detail, and mine watch. What happens when the VBSS team is out and emergency flight 
quarters is called—and sailors that need to be there for the emergency flight quarters are 
on the VBSS team? The ability for the ships to conduct the emergency landing of a 
helicopter will be degraded.   
5. Types and Levels of VBSS Boardings 
VBSS boardings serve many purposes, from peaceful rescue and assistance 
operations to noncompliant, hostile marine interdictions. There are four levels according 
to Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3–07.11M, and these refer to the 
level of resistance that is anticipated in the boarding (Salerno & Jewett, 2008). 
1. Level 1: Compliant boarding 
2. Level II: NCB, in which embarking the suspect vessel can be 
accomplished by rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) or similar small craft 
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3. Level III: NCB, in which embarking the suspect vessel requires helicopter 
insertion or specially trained and equipped forces 
4. Level IV: Opposed boarding 
U.S. Navy VBSS teams are only qualified to conduct level II boardings. Among the level 
I and II boardings, there are different types of missions, which include approach and 
assist visits (AAV) and interdiction patrols (IPATS). The purpose of these missions is to 
provide assistance to vessels in distress, gain intelligence, and interdict the trafficking of 
suspicious substances.    
E. DRAWBACKS 
Among the VBSS missions, a goal of CTF-150 is to collect intelligence through 
AAVs and IPATS (“CTF-150 Maritime Security,” n.d.). The “shoot first, ask questions 
later” culture of the Marines sometimes brings incompatibility with intelligence 
gathering. However, not even Navy VBSS teams are trained with the skills to collect 
intelligence, and often there is such a language barrier against which intelligence 
collection is not effective.   
In addition, ships would be left without an organic VBSS team while not under 
the tactical control of CTF-150. Although this could be a concern, the ships could 
maintain qualified boat crews to conduct day-to-day operations other than VBSS, AAV, 
and IPATS. The ships are also required to maintain an SRF; these personnel attend SRF 
basic and SRF A school. The SRF is capable of protecting any U.S. Navy asset—
meaning the ship would not be in danger of losing its capability to defend against an 
enemy attempting to board it. The expertise of a qualified VBSS team is generally not 
needed at any time until under tactical control of a CMF command, such as CTF-150.   
Last is the issue of logistics: getting the Marines to the ships that are assigned to 
CTF-150. CTF-150’s AOR covers more than 2 million square miles in the Red Sea, Gulf 
of Aden, and Gulf of Oman. The Maritime Security Patrol Area is a more manageable 
strip of ocean in the Gulf of Aden that covers about 450 nm (Combined Maritime 
Forces).  
 18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 19 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Questions have been asked about the capabilities of the Navy’s VBSS mission 
areas on ships that are affected when VBSS teams are manned with Navy personnel (Ray, 
2010) (Rank, 2012). The results from the following three theses prove the need to provide 
options for changes in VBSS operations.   
1. Identifying Capabilities Gaps in Shipboard Visit, Board, Search, 
Seizure (VBSS) Teams—Ray, 2010 
This thesis concentrates on the prescribed mission of the VBSS teams and the 
gaps in capabilities based on surveys and documentation. A 17-question survey was 
given to 10 randomly selected ships: three from Naval Station Norfolk, three from Naval 
Station San Diego, two from Naval Station Mayport, and two from Naval Station Pearl 
Harbor. The mix of ships surveyed was two CGs, two DDGs, two frigates, two dock 
landing ships, and two amphibious transport docks (landing platform dock ships). Of the 
ships contacted, five commanding officers responded. Of a potential 105 responses, 45 
sailors participated. Keeping in mind that this information may be slightly biased by the 
fact that the personnel that chose to respond did so because they had grievances to voice, 
the results showed that VBSS teams are negatively affected by manning issues and that 
personnel are not able to train to the standards required for this warfare area.  
The results from the survey showed that 87.1% of the responses reported that 
manning had a negative impact on VBSS training opportunities, whereas only 45.2% said 
that manning had a negative effect on actual operations. This means that the ships had to 
make different decisions concerning manning when it came to training and operations. 
One way to see how the manning is managed is to look at the underway watch bills. 
These are documents that are promulgated and normally signed by the commanding 
officer to direct each sailor on what his or her watch station is while underway. Normally, 
no one is left off the watch bill and, because VBSS is an evolution, sailors are pulled 
from their watch stations to participate. When asked if the underway watch bills are set 
 20 
up to allow members to participate in VBSS training on a regular basis, 94.9% of the 
responses were “no” or “sometimes.” This means that only about 5% of personnel were 
given the opportunity to train for this dangerous operation on a regular basis. On the other 
hand, when asked whether underway watch bills were set up to allow members to 
participate in actual operations on a regular basis, 82.1% responded “yes” or 
“sometimes.”  
These disparities between training and actual operations show that ships might not 
be properly manned to be able to prioritize the VBSS mission area. The conclusion and 
recommendations of this thesis were: (1) to use embarked units to conduct the VBSS 
evolution and, (2) to bolster VBSS training while underway by using a deployable 
mission trainer. The author provided examples of other embarked units that the Navy 
already uses such as explosive ordinance disposal and information exploitation teams 
(IETs). The examples showed that there was already a mechanism in place to distribute 
these embarked units and that using it was a viable option. 
2. Manning Issues Involving Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS)—
Rank, 2012 
This thesis dealt exclusively with the manpower issues. The author looked at 
ships being forced to compromise between sailors operating under their primary NECs or 
the VBSS mission, whether in training or operations. Rank went provided an in-depth 
look at what the VBSS training requirements are, both in the amount of time and the 
prerequisites required. The main purpose behind this thesis was to analyze of the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of current VBSS teams and of various 
other options.   
An overview of Rank’s findings includes positives and negatives for both sides of 
the problem. One strength of keeping the VBSS teams as an organic shipboard entity 
would be the flexibility that comes with the consistency of training and evaluation across 
all deployable surface vessels. Piracy is an age-old problem, but the relatively recent 
severity of this issue—and the undisputed success of the coalition’s antipiracy efforts—
show that the Navy’s VBSS program is not a failure. Another strength is that the diversity 
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achieved by manning a VBSS team with many different technical backgrounds increases 
the team’s capabilities. The weaknesses are large, however: lack of training and 
manpower can be a hurdle for any team to overcome. The lack of training has already 
been covered, but the lack of manpower can be expressed further, as follows. 
There are a total of 141 Navy ships that retain the capability to conduct 
VBSS operations anywhere around the world. Multiplying 141 by the 
number of boarding personnel required (12), results in approximately 
1,692 sailors trained to conduct VBSS operations in the Navy’s fleet. A 
majority of these sailors are rated and fulfill mission critical Navy Enlisted 
Codes (NEC), requiring them to be onboard to focus on mission critical 
equipment (Rank, 2012). 
This statement was from 2012; since then, both the Marines and the Navy are being 
called upon to further decrease their manpower.  
3. Marine Corps Drawdown, Force Structure Initiatives, and Roles and 
Missions: Background and Issues for Congress—Feickert, 2014 
As the Marine Corps downsizes its total end strength from 202,000 personnel in 
2011 to 174,000 by 2017, the need to redefine and restructure the current forces is 
crucial.   
A sampling of academic discussions focusing on the Marine Corps of the 
future suggests the Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF) could be 
given the lead responsibility for worldwide ground engagement. Another 
proposal suggests that Marines should operate in small, decentralized units 
and that the Marines’ Focus could shift to company and battalion-sized 
units, the so called “sweet spot” for joint ground forces (Feickert, 2014). 
In his study, Feickert also cites an article by the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments that proposes the Marines should be operating in smaller, more 
independent units, and that these smaller units could deal with “pirates and small non-
state terrorist organizations and would be well-suited for conducting raids and other short 
duration operations.” In addition, the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 
has been evaluating more efficient ways to restructure. An initiative has been started to 
begin deploying special operation forces with MEUs.   
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Another option this study discusses is to create a littoral operation Marine Air 
Ground Task Force that would have a rifle company embarked on an amphibious ship as 
well as two to three fast frigate ships. These are a relatively new concept and are not 
intended to be multi-mission platforms. Each warfare area in which this type of ship 
performs must be onloaded in a mission package. Further research would be needed to 
determine if the fast frigates could accomplish VBSS boardings along with a prescribed 
mission.   
B. OPNAV 3501.101E DDG-51 ROC POE 
According to the DDG-51 ROC POE, Missions of State (MOS) mission area, 
VBSS is required to be F/E in condition III steaming and L/E in condition I—this means 
that in condition III (readiness condition for wartime steaming), the ship must have a 
temporarily manned team (E) with full capability (F) in VBSS. In condition I (general 
quarters, each sailor at his or her battle station), the ship must be temporarily manned 
with limited capability (L) in VBSS shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  DDG VBSS/MIO ROC (Guillory, 2003) 
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C. COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT INSTRUCTION 3502.3: 
SURFACE FORCE READINESS MANUAL 
All of the warfare areas on a ship must go through one form of certification or 
another prior to deployment. The Fleet Replacement Training Plan (FRTP), which is a 
cycle that each ship goes through, from maintenance availabilities through the 
sustainment phase, is shown in Figure 6. The DDG 51 class has 21 different warfare 
areas that are assessed in the unit tactical, basic phase, of the FRTP (Thomas & Hunt, 
2012).   
 
Figure 6.  Training Continuum (Thomas & Hunt, 2012) 
The VBSS warfare area is shown in the unit tactical area of Figure 5. There are 
four stages: 2.1 is the administrative assessment, and 2.2–2.4 are the classroom through 
certification stages. According to the Afloat Training Group (ATG) San Diego, most of 
the ships face difficulties in passing the administrative phase. The ATG believes this 
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happens because VBSS is not a very high priority in relation to the other warfare 
qualifications, such as firefighting or missile systems. In the administrative assessment, 
the officers in charge of VBSS must show that each team member has a current gun and 
swim qualification and has successfully been through all of the VBSS training. Because 
all of these qualifications require extensive planning, they often are difficult to maintain 
when the officers in charge of VBSS have other positions and warfare area certifications 
to manage as well. Because of this extensive certification process, the requirements listed 
in the ROC—that make VBSS an evolution because it is temporarily manned instead of 
an actual mission area—are in direct contrast with directives in the Surface Force 
Readiness Manual. Exercise requirements that must be assessed satisfactorily for a ship 
to pass the basic phase and be considered ready to deploy are shown in Table 2 (Beaver 
& Kitchener, 2012).  
 
Number  Exercise Name  Amplification 
01  Review VBSS Administration  IAW applicable Mission Area references  
02  Demonstrate Level Of Knowledge (LOK)  
IAW ATG LOK Exam Matrix (AVG 
>= 80%)  
03  Conduct Non-Compliant Boarding Operations  
Min 1 Team RHIB may be 
required for Hook and Pole  
04  Conduct Compliant Boarding Operations  Min 1 Team  
05  Conduct Approach/Maritime Influence Operations  
Min 1 Team RHIB may be 
required for Hook and Pole  
06  Conduct Detainee Operations  COND III, V: Ship Wide  
Note: IAW – In Accordance With, ATG – Afloat Training Group, LOK – Level Of 
Knowledge 
Table 2.   Required Exercises for VBSS per the Surface Force Exercise 
Manual (Thomas & Hunt, 2012) 
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In addition to the exercises reviewed by ATG for shipboard VBSS certification, 
exercises must be done periodically to maintain this skillset (Table 3). These are 
considered special evolutions and require the personnel assigned to the VBSS team to 
suspend their daily work to participate. The evolutions require that ships have VBSS 
training team, which is a group of organic (stationed onboard) qualified VBSS members 
that are responsible for conducting and assessing shipboard training mentioned 
previously. The ATG is responsible for assessing and certifying the VBSS team as well 
as the VBSS training team, and they require, according to the Surface Force Readiness 
Manual and Surface Force Exercise Manual, VBSS pre-training visits. A pre-training 
visit is an informal pre-assessment for a warfare area in which the ATG team comes out 
to the ship and conducts the certification without the possibility of reporting a failure. 
These pre-training visits are helpful, but can also mean that each warfare area, including 
VBSS, technically gets assessed twice and sometimes even three times when multiple 
visits are required. Each pre-training visit can take an entire day to complete, and require 
all 14 members of the VBSS team to be present (Beaver & Kitchener, 2012). 
Table 3.   Required Respective VBSS Exercises (Thomas & Hunt, 2012) 
 
 
Number Exercise Name Amplification Frequency 
(days) 
01 Conduct Non-Compliant 
Boarding Operations 
Min 1 Team RHIB may be 
required for Hook and Pole 
180 
02 Conduct Compliant 
Boarding Operations 




Min 1 Team May require RHIB 
for Hook and Pole 
180 
04 Conduct Detainee 
Operations 
Min. 2 fully qualified 
Boarding Team Members, Ship’s 
Detainee Handling Team. 
180 
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D. NTTP 3–07.11M 
The U.S. Navy follows the Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, (NTTP) 3–
07.11M to train, equip, and employ current VBSS teams. There are dozens of prescribed 
capabilities that these VBSS teams, manned with sailors that are participating as a 
collateral duty, must be able to accomplish. Some of these capabilities are shown in Table 
4 (NTTP 3–07.11M) (Salerno & Jewett, 2008).  
 
Boarding Team Skillset Force Protection/Security Force 
 Medical and Casualty Treatment 
 Navigation and Seamanship 
 Engineering and Stability (Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical) 
 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Exposure and Detection Skills 
 Second Class Swimmer 
 Language Proficiency 
 Information/Material Assessment 
Table 4.   NTTP 3–07.11M Boarding Team Skillset (Salerno & Jewett, 2008) 
As extensive as this list looks, the teams that are responsible for performing these 
functions are not able to practice them on a routine basis, according to a survey 
conducted by Kevin Ray of the Naval Postgraduate School (Ray, 2010). 
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IV. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
A. BACKGROUND 
Whenever a major change with VBSS is proposed, it is necessary to determine if 
change can even be accomplished. By developing this analytical approach, a framework 
is being provided to determine whether to move forward or decide that the change is not 
worth the cost or effort.  
The tables and figures presented previously provide information that determines 
requirements for manning, training, and certifying VBSS teams. This analytical approach 
takes into account the information for equipment, ranges, personnel and capabilities, but 
there can be more constraints and restraints that can be added in for future research for a 
full transition to an exclusively Marine Corps VBSS team.  
B. DEVELOPMENT 
The CH-46 helicopter was chosen to develop this analytical approach because of 
its distance range and capacity to carry personnel. (If another aircraft were to be 
considered, then the range in this analytical approach would have to be changed to 
accommodate the new parameters.) The CH-46 can carry an entire VBSS team and their 
gear to a distance of 600 nm. Because this helicopter can carry these personnel the entire 
distance of the 450-nm Maritime Security Patrol Area, it allows an adequate manpower 
supply to carry out the mission. This can be said for any aircraft that can equal or exceed 
the range and capacity of the CH-46. 
Ships often operate within assigned boundaries called operational boxes 
(OPBOXs). In this approach, OPBOXs were developed to give a visual of how ships 
could be organized for personnel transfers (Figure 7). The distance between the boxes is 
the main constraint for feasibility of transfer, and this is where an analytical approach 
such as a mathematical model is useful. The OPBOXs labeled T1, T2, and T3 are the 
target ships for assigning a VBSS mission requiring a Marine Corps VBSS team. The 
OPBOXs labeled SS1 and SS2 are the supply ships, or the ships that the Marine VBSS 
team would originate from.  
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Figure 7.  Map of Gulf of Aden with Operation Boxes  
C. ANALYTICAL APPROACH  
This analytical approach is developed with feasibility in mind. To express this 
approach, the following notations are used: 
𝑅𝑅 = [range of the aircraft in nautical miles (nm)] 
𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 = [capacity of the aircraft for carrying personnel] 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 = [capacity of the aircraft for carrying equipment] 
𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = [distance between origin]𝑥𝑥 [and destination] 𝑦𝑦 [where] 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2,𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2,𝑇𝑇3} 𝑦𝑦 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2,𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2,𝑇𝑇3}, 𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝑦𝑦 
As mentioned previously, CH-46 was selected because of its past usage as a 
helicopter of interest for transferring VBSS teams from ship x to ship y. The capacity of 
CH-46 for personnel and equipment transfers—𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒—are more than adequate to 
carry necessary manpower and equipment. Therefore, the feasibility of such transfer 
exists. Because the range of the CH-46 when carrying personnel and equipment is 600 
nm, choosing any other aircraft would change the range. The following conditions hold 
for any aircraft as long as,  
𝑅𝑅 ≥ 600 
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The feasibility conditions for an aircraft to reach the first destination without refueling 
should be that the total distance travelled is less than the range of the aircraft. The various 
cases for the possible routes are shown in Figures 8–11. 
 
Case 1: From staging ship to target ship, one leg 
 𝑑𝑑(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘) ≤ 𝑅𝑅              𝑖𝑖 = 1,2    𝑘𝑘 = 1,2,3  (1) 
 
Figure 8.  Examples of Distances Traveled by CH-46 in Inequalities: Case 1  
Case 2: From one staging ship to another and then to the target ship, two legs 
 
 𝑑𝑑�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗� +  𝑑𝑑�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘, �  ≤ 𝑅𝑅         𝑖𝑖 = 1,2   𝑗𝑗 = 1,2   𝑘𝑘 = 1,2,3   𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 (2) 
 
  
Figure 9.  An Example of Distance Travelled by CH-46 in Inequalities: Case 2  
 
Case 3: From staging ship to a target ship with a stopover at another target ship, two 
legs 
 
 𝑑𝑑(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘) +  𝑑𝑑(𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘,𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙, )  ≤ 𝑅𝑅         𝑖𝑖 = 1,2   𝑘𝑘 = 1,2 ,3  𝑙𝑙 = 1,2,3   𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑙𝑙 (3) 
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Figure 10.  An Example of Distance Travelled by CH-46 in Inequalities: Case 3  
Case 4: From one staging ship to another and then to a target ship with a stopover at 
another target ship, three legs 
  
 𝑑𝑑�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗� + 𝑑𝑑�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗,𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘� + 𝑑𝑑(𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘,𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙) ≤ 𝑅𝑅   
 
 𝑟𝑟 = 1,2    𝑗𝑗 = 1,2    𝑘𝑘 = 1,2,3    𝑙𝑙 = 1,2,3    𝑟𝑟 ≠ 𝑗𝑗    𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑙𝑙 (4) 
 
 
Figure 11.  An Example of Distance Traveled by CH-46 in Inequalities: Case 4  
Figures 8–11 illustrate the distances on the left hand side of inequalities (1)–(4). 
These distances are the distance travelled by CH-46 for pickups and drop-offs. Such 
maneuvers will be possible if the inequalities in each case are satisfied. 
D. ANALYSIS  
The inequalities shown here offer feasibility conditions in terms of distance 
traveled by the transportation craft and its range. Even if locations of staging ships 
change and the range of the craft changes in the future, the feasibility of inequalities (1)–
(4) will enable the transfer of teams.   
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In addition, using this analytical approach, the user can apply more specific 
conditions that are in place for the target and supply ships to determine the most efficient 
option for the transport aircraft used. If the mode of transportation is a restriction, then 
that information can determine the most efficient staging of the ship that will be 
supplying the VBSS team. Expanding the types of ships that the VBSS teams will be 
transported to will add restrictions as some ships do not have the capability to land 
certain helicopters like the CH-46. In this case, the option to fast rope to the ship without 
the helicopter landing could alleviate this restriction.   
Modifications such as originating points being onshore can easily be incorporated 
into this approach. Ground vehicles and aircraft will have their own feasibility 
conditions; however, they can be derived based on the primary feasibility conditions (1)–
(4) given here. The capacities of the ground transportation may prove to be a bottleneck 
in such modifications, for example.    
The outcome of this analytical approach allows more specific information to be 
used as input for determining the feasibility of a personnel transfer. There are many 
unknowns resulting from fluctuating operating environments, but the basic constraints 
and restraints are in place. Complexities such as refueling, multiple transporting vessels, 
increased ranges, and a combination of shore- and sea-based staging areas give rise to 
decision variables that can be further incorporated with development of a more complex 
model in the future.   
Conditions for a Marine Corps VBSS team transfer to a target ship will likely be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The CH-46 helicopter can carry an entire 14-person 
team and equipment, but if that is not available then the parameters will need to be 
adjusted. The supply ship could be a standard amphibious vessel, as analyzed in this 
thesis, or a land-based staging area, in which case the target ships would be the only 
adjustable variables. In each case, however, the range of the chosen form of 
transportation will likely determine the feasibility of the transfer.   
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The mission of VBSS plays an important role in the security and stability of any 
region in which it is conducted, and because this mission’s significant importance it 
needs to be undertaken with the best options available. Even though there were no 
successful pirate attacks in 2013 there have already been several in 2014 (Millen, 2104). 
Currently, VBSS teams consisting of Navy sailors are primarily responsible for this 
mission, even though the training falls outside of most of their career paths. It would be 
more effective to incorporate the VBSS curriculum into the training pipeline of an 
infantry Marine.  
Even though the number of ships since 2010 have decreased by 10%, the amount 
of days spent underway have increased by 15% (Rank, 2012). Navy ships are being 
required to spend more time on deployment as well as shorten the amount of time spent 
in port. The Fleet Replacement Training Plan does not change, and ships with shorter in-
port periods are not exempt from certifications (Thomas & Hunt, 2012). Due to the 
rigorous turn-around time periods, it is necessary now more then ever to ensure that 
priorities on training are clear. When VBSS training needs to be conducted it should be 
the priority just like flight quarters or fire fighting, but as studies have shown, it is not 
given the same level of importance. Marine Corps manning has decreased during this 
time as well, however, the priority of training for Marines is more closely aligned with 
VBSS training. Close order combat training and Marine Corps Martial Arts Program 
could be integrated more easily with VBSS training.   
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. What alternatives are available to conduct VBSS in the U.S. Navy?  
 a. Conclusions 
The Marine Corps has the appropriate qualitative manpower and training 
programs available to execute the VBSS mission, and doing so would bring them back to 
their roots of serving in a maritime security role. The 2015 Quadrennial Defense Review 
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outlines a drastic cut in manpower for the Marines, and research is being undertaken to 
remodel the current force structure into smaller units (Hagel, 2014). Reassigning the 
VBSS mission to the Marines not only increases readiness in that warfare area, but it also 
aligns with the national strategy and priorities. Some research has concluded that the 
Marine Corps of the future will be very different from what it is today and will consist of 
several modular units that are flexible and highly trained to a specific mission. This 
research supports the idea of including VBSS units among the many force packages 
(Bedell, 2012).   
Marines already have an extensive training pipeline for VBSS. Because this 
training is currently used to train Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), it 
would only need to be altered slightly to accommodate the increased requirement of 
Marines. MARSOC has an existing Maritime Raid Force (MRF) that carries all of the 
same qualifications as a VBSS team, plus the ability to conduct opposed boardings and 
helicopter delivery (“24th MEU’s Maritime Raid Force Marines Conduct Realistic Urban 
Training,” 2014). The MRF operates under the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which 
deploys onboard Navy amphibious readiness groups. In 2010, the USS Dubuque (LPD-8) 
and the 15th MEU conducted an exercise in Maritime Interdiction Operations in which 
the Reconnaissance Platoon boarded a noncompliant vessel and neutralized the threat 
while the Navy VBSS team boarded (Orrell, 2010). Commander U.S. 3rd Fleet at the 
time, Vice Admiral Richard W. Hunt said, “This exercise has been very successful, this 
will provide additional VBSS capability for our maritime forces in the future.” In 2014, 
Marine special operations forces conducted VBSS training in an exercise called Raven 
(McKee, 2010). An exercise officer stated “The teams don’t have to learn many new 
skills to be able to conduct a VBSS mission, once on the ship it is relatively the same as a 
direct action mission on a house” (Lee 2014). The officer also stated:  
VBSS is not a new operational concept to MARSOC and these types of 
missions tie back to the amphibious roots of the Marine Corps. We may 
not have been doing these sorts of operations to date, but if you look at our 
roots and where we came from, VBSS is something we need to be 
prepared to do. (Lee, 2014) 
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The Marines have also been training in the VBSS mission with the Coastal Riverine 
Squadron in an exercise called Bold Alligator. Lt. j.g. Kristopher DeVisser was an 
assistant boarding officer during this event and said, “Bold Alligator is intended to 
improve Navy and Marine Corps amphibious core competencies” (Aldape, 2014). 
b. Recommendations 
It is recommended that Commander Naval Surface Forces, N96 (Surface Warfare 
Directorate), N95 (Expeditionary Warfare), and U.S. Marine Forces Command, liaison in 
order to turn over the roles and responsibilities of the VBSS mission to the U.S. Marine 
Forces Command. 
Sailors are trained in specific ratings so that they have the skills necessary to keep 
equipment working and to maintain their watch at high level of readiness at all times. 
Relieving the Navy of the VBSS mission will allow ships to prioritize training and 
schedules to be more appropriately aligned with given instructions. 
Just as sailors are specifically trained, so are the Marines, and for just as 
important, but different, reasons. The specialties that the infantry Marines are trained for 
would bring much-needed support to the VBSS mission area. With all of the options that 
have been explored in the studies cited previously, the Marine Corps mission and training 
more closely relates to VBSS than the training of Navy sailors.  
2. What is the appropriate quantity and quality of Marine manpower to 
compose a VBSS team? 
 a. Conclusions 
The Marine Corps already has a training pipeline in place for the Maritime Raid 
Force (MRF). Using the curriculum for the current Navy VBSS training program, MRF 
training can be altered to meet both requirements. The MRF is composed of the Marine 
Occupational Standard (MOS) 0300, which has a complementary training pipeline to the 
VBSS curriculum. The Marines that graduate from the school of infantry (SOI) will 
already have a strong base of knowledge and ability to be trained to conduct VBSS 
boardings (“Maritime Raid force,” n.d.).  
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There is no evidence to support the need for a change in the structure of the 
current VBSS team. As stated previously, exercises have already been conducted with an 
integrated Navy and Marine Corps team; Navy personnel could just be replaced with 
Marines for the proposed model to work. One downside to this is the loss of diversity in 
skills on the team, which can be a benefit (Rank, 2012). The supporting forces on the ship 
control team, which can relay instructions to get the VBSS team through an unforeseen 
circumstance, can overcome this. 
b. Recommendations 
The research recommends assigning an Intelligence Exploitation Team (IET) to 
each VBSS team to gain intelligence that may be otherwise overlooked by the Marines. 
There are about 180 intelligence specialists from the Navy Expeditionary Intelligence 
Command (NEIC) Forces, which has MIO IET as a primary mission area. When paired 
with a fleet VBSS team, the NEIC MIO-IETs are required to be fully mission capable. 
According to statements from the Projected Operational Environment (POE) for MIO-
IET: 
NEIC MIO-IETs are comprised of deployable eight-man teams capable of 
task organizing (in part or in whole) to conduct intelligence exploitation 
operations directly supporting the JFMCC or NCC requirements (NEIC 
ROCPOE). 
MIO-IET specific collection and exploitation skills include civil maritime 
expertise, DOMEX, interrogation, monitoring techniques, theater 
familiarity, and targeting. Team members are certified to conduct VBSS 
level I/II boardings (NEIC ROCPOE). 
Deploying a MIO IET with the MEU in order to supply each Marine 
VBSS Team with intelligence specialists will greatly enhance the overall 
efficacy of AAV’s and IPATS. (Scott, 2010)  
 
Also, because this command’s operational environment includes conducting both seizure 
and boarding operations, the personnel are already trained. This will make the transition 
less costly and easier to carry out as compared with a unit without an established training 
pipeline. The requirements for the potential operating environment are shown in Figure 
12 (Scott, 2010). 
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Figure 12.  POE Requirements for MIO-IET 
3. Using an analytical approach, can Marine VBSS teams be efficiently 
transported to ships that are assigned a VBSS mission? 
 a. Conclusions 
The outcome of this analytical approach allows for more specific information to 
be input in order to determine the feasibility of a personnel transfer. There are many 
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unknowns due to a fluctuating operating environment, but the basic constraints and 
restraints are in place. The complexities such as refueling, multiple transporting vessels, 
increased ranges, and a combination of shore based and sea based staging areas, give rise 
to decision variables can be further incorporated with development of a more complex 
model in the future.  
Modifications such as originating points being onshore can easily be incorporated 
into the analytical approach described in this project. Ground vehicles and aircrafts will 
have their own feasibility conditions; however, they can be derived based on the primary 
feasibility conditions (1)–(4) given here. The ground transportation capacities may prove 
to be a bottleneck in such modifications.    
This research has produced three different courses of action (COA). The first 
COA is to reassign the VBSS mission to the Marine Corps, and keep the teams with their 
MEU onboard afloat units and deploy to other ships as needed. The second COA is to 
reassign the VBSS mission to be manned, trained, and equipped by the Marine Corps 
using shore-based units that will deploy to ships as needed. The third COA is to maintain 
the status quo with the Navy manning, training, and equipping VBSS teams. 
b. Recommendations 
COA 1 is recommended because it would allow for the transition of the VBSS 
mission to the Marine Corps with the fewest actual changes and least amount of cost.   
COA 1 
This course of action would mean reassigning the VBSS mission to Marines from 
deployed MEUs, but the teams would be kept aboard their amphibious ship in the ESG 
and then be transported from their home ship to other ships. No additional personnel 
would be added to the MEU to support this mission; instead, Marines that are currently 
stationed with the MEU will be provided additional training to conduct the VBSS 
mission exclusively. This option solely involves an adjustment in manning and does not 
require any changes in manpower. 
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(1) Strengths of COA 1 
Keeping the Marines onboard the amphibious ships will not add any more costs to 
what already exists. Marines could also use the shipboard environment for more realistic 
training while waiting to be sent to a ship to conduct the actual VBSS missions. Keeping 
them with the MEU also allows for more flexibility when planning contingency 
operations, such as an amphibious assault. If the Marine VBSS teams are ashore when 
this planning begins, then additional logistical steps must be taken to get them onboard 
before the assault; otherwise, there will be fewer personnel to carry out the mission. This 
could affect the safety of the MEU.  
MEU’s already deploy with a Maritime Raid Force (MRF) that is trained to 
conduct all levels of VBSS boardings. The training pipeline is already in place it would 
just need to be expanded to allow for a larger force, and they have already been 
successfully operating onboard amphibious ships.   
(2) Weaknesses of COA 1  
Having an asset that needs to be transported from ship to ship is going to require 
more extensive logistics then an organic asset. The extra effort that is required to move a 
Marine Corps VBSS team can be considered a hindrance and make the execution of the 
mission less flexible. However, once the Marine VBSS team is onboard the ship that is 
required to carry out the VBSS mission is more capable to conduct different kinds of 
opposed boardings as well as helicopter insertions. Another weakness is the culture shift 
that would need to occur. Cruisers and Destroyers are not accustomed to having Marines 
onboard during deployment and space is limited. Common spaces would be more 
crowded and lines for meals would be longer so this will require some patience on behalf 
of the ship’s crew and the Marines temporarily stationed onboard during the transition.   
COA 2 
Another option would be to train the Marine Corps to conduct the VBSS mission 
exclusively and then deploy these VBSS teams to ships from shore stations such as 
Bahrain. This can be done two different ways: train special teams that are not attached to 
MEUs and their primary job is VBSS, or train special teams attached to MEUs and then 
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send those teams ashore during the MEU deployment. Because the first option of using a 
special unit not attached to an MEU is more of a manpower issue and not a manning 
issue, that option is not be explored further. Manpower would require additional 
personnel, whereas manning would only require a reallocation of current personnel. 
(3) Strengths of COA 2 
The Marine Corps trains its members for close quarters combat from the 
beginning and throughout their training continuum, and there is already a training 
program for an MRF, which is similar to VBSS training. Only minor changes in training 
would be needed to have a complete Marine Corps VBSS training. While based on shore, 
the teams can conduct daily training because there will be no other requirements for them 
to fulfill. This will allow for a higher level of readiness than the Navy VBSS teams could 
perform. 
Having the teams ashore, waiting to deploy to ships tasked with a VBSS mission 
allows for fewer steps in the logistics chain. When these teams are needed, they are in 
one place and can be called upon at any time. Also, while they are ashore, there would be 
no other requirements for them, so they could maintain a constant state of readiness.  
(4) Weaknesses of COA 2  
Stationing military members ashore comes with higher cost resulting from 
housing and food when compared with keeping them aboard a ship. Because it is 
desirable to avoid cost increases, this is a major weakness. Training is also important for 
consistently successful VBSS missions, and although teams would be able to train ashore, 
the training would be more realistic at sea. Another potential weakness is the VBSS unit 
may become too isolated from the MEU and start to identify more with the shore-based 
unit. This may decrease the MEU’s overall cohesiveness.  
COA 3 
This thesis, along with previous research, has thoroughly examined the Navy’s 
VBSS program to fully understand how the program is manned, trained, and equipped. 
The manning of VBSS teams is arbitrary and usually based on the physical condition of a 
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sailor. The VBSS evolution is temporarily manned, which means it occurs in addition to a 
sailor’s regular watch standing and productive work. The current training program by the 
Center for Security Forces has proven to produce quality VBSS members, but 
maintaining this skill set while back onboard the ships in a training environment is not 
occurring. Maintaining the status quo is an option, but there are many points to consider.  
(5) Strengths of COA 3 
The main strength of keeping an organic VBSS team onboard each ship is 
flexibility because it allows fleet commanders the ability to direct a ship to react at a 
moment’s notice in the event of an emergency. Mitigation to the potential loss of this 
ability is to continue to train all sailors upon check-in with the Ships Reaction Force-
Basic School so they have the skills to defend the ship while in port. Ships should also 
continue to send a group of select sailors to the SRF A School to learn how to react in an 
emergency (such as an intruder onboard the ship or any pier-side attack). This will allow 
ships forces to maintain a ships reaction force team (SRF) and backup reaction force team 
(BRF) to exclusively protect the ship.   
There is also flexibility in the diversity of the Navy team members. Whereas a 
Marine Corps VBSS team would be all infantry marines who were trained in the same 
way throughout their careers, Navy VBSS teams have a variety of ratings, from 
engineering to information technology to culinary specialist. These diverse skillsets can 
be useful when the team faces unexpected challenges while boarding an unknown ship 
(Rank 2012). Because there will continue to be a requirement for a shipboard support 
team, these skills will not be lost with a Marine Corps VBSS team; instructions could be 
transmitted over radio instead.  
(6) Weaknesses of COA 3 
The highly technical mission of the Navy requires highly trained technicians, and 
while being trained to operate and fix the world’s most complex military equipment, 
there is little time for the combat training that VBSS requires. These skills can be taught 
in VBSS schools, but maintaining them requires time that the ship’s schedule cannot 
allow for because of maintaining the ability to perform technical skills takes precedence. 
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There are drills that the VBSS team must accomplish to maintain their proficiencies, 
according to the Surface Force Readiness Manual, but as stated previously, only 5.1% of 
sailors reported the ability to participate in these drills on a regular basis (Ray 2010).  
Not only is time a scarce resource, but also the personnel to serve on these VBSS 
teams are limited. Typically, personnel are pulled from their watch stations to participate 
in this special evolution. The ships are manned by allotting each sailor 8 hours of watch 
per day; when a sailor is taken out of this rotation, others must do more to fill the gap. 
Ships are deploying more frequently, and approximately 43% report that they spent 3 or 
more months conducting VBSS missions (Ray 2010). The personnel that were trained to 
perform in specific watch stations should instead be concentrating on those watch stations 
to maintain proficiency and keep the ship at the highest level of readiness. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The outcome of this analytical approach has provided a framework for future 
studies with the input of more specific information. Variables such as range, capacity, 
and alternative forms of transportation can be added to make the outcome of the analysis 
more specific to a situation. Also, more constraints—such as the weight of various 
equipment load outs and sleeping space onboard smaller ships—can be added to narrow 
down the outcome as well.  
Previous research has shown there are issues with mental and physical fatigue due 
to the long duration of VBSS mission onboard the Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boat (RHIB). 
They do not have appropriate seating for all members of a VBSS team, so there is not 
support for the long-term impact of waves. There are newly designed RHIBs in use by 
the Coast Guard and some special forces units that would be much better for the Marines 
to use while conducting VBSS missions. Combining the logistics of moving these new 
RHIBs and the Marine VBSS teams into a new model would add to the safety and 
effectiveness of VBSS missions.  
When the range and capabilities are kept within the given parameters, Marine 
VBSS teams can be transported relatively efficiently. Transporting Marine Corps VBSS 
teams from ship to ship may not be outwardly efficient because the Navy already has a 
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program to man, train, and equip its own teams. However, the improvements in readiness 
for both the VBSS mission and the ability for ships’ crews to direct more attention to 
higher priority missions such as Air Warfare or Ballistic Missile Defense will outweigh 
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APPENDIX. VBSS SCHOOL DESCRIPTIONS 
School Description  
SRF Basic 
Course graduates will be able to perform the duties and responsibilities 
of an armed sentry for controlling access to U. S. Navy assets. Students 
will learn to implement immediate actions to identify, assess, track and 
deter potential threats, utilizing and demonstrating the proper tactics, 
techniques and procedures of the Use of Force Continuum along with 
proper implementation of Force Protection procedures, watch standing 
techniques and be capable of interacting with security reaction forces as 
a basic reaction force team member. This is a High-Risk course of 
instruction, and training consists of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) pepper 
spray as well as live fire of the 9 mm pistol, 12-gauge shotgun, and M-16 
rifle. All courses of fire used for this course are specified in 
OPNAVINST 3591.1F  
SRF Advanced 
This course allows personnel to perform as a Naval Security Force team 
member. This team will act to prevent threats, whether from the pier, 
small boat, or any other means of penetrating a unit. This course will 
also train personnel to perform as a Naval Security Force team leader. In 
this position, the Team Leader will manage a security force team through 
assignment of members, ensure members receive necessary training, and 
coordinate team responses and perimeters. The Team Leader will also be 
able to conduct briefs and debriefs for the team and the Chain of 
Command. Course includes Operational Risk Management; Tactical 
Team Movements; Tactical Team Leadership; Tactical Communications; 
Use of Force and Deadly Force; Personnel Restraint Devices; Force 
Protection Search Procedures; Tactical Team Management; Tactical 
Mission Planning; and Standard Operating Procedures. Instructors will 
have to meet the Navy qualifications on the 9mm pistol and re-qualify 
semi- annually in accordance with OPNAVINST 3591.1F  
VBSS NCB 
This course is designed to prepare Shipboard Boarding Teams and Boarding 
Officers (BO) to perform Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) 
procedures (Compliant and Non-Compliant Low Freeboard) in support of 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). The course provides Safety; Water 
Survival; Use of Force/Deadly Force Policy; Physical Training/Defensive 
Tactics; Equipment Familiarization/Gear Issue; Compliant Boarding; Non-
Compliant Boarding; Knot-Tying Techniques; Service Pistol, Rifle, and 
Shotgun Tactical Shooting; Caving Ladder Climbing; Rappelling and 
Containerized Inspection; Tactical Movements; Document Inspection, 
Verification and Intelligence Gathering; Underway Ship Boarding; Non-
Lethal Weapons; Mission Planning; Effective Communications; Combat 
First Aid; and Prisoner Escort. The culmination of this training is an 
evaluated non-compliant boarding scenario involving boarding an afloat 
target. This course is designated as High Risk.  
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VBSS BO 
This course prepares the VBSS Boarding Officer (BO), Assistant 
Boarding Officer (ABO), Security Team Leaders (STL), Liaison Officer 
and Intelligence Specialist (IS) to plan, execute, teach the biometrics 
collection equipment, and debrief VBSS procedures (Compliant and 
Non- Compliant Low Freeboard) in support of Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO). This course is designed for the BO/ABO/STL to 
attend prior to attending the NCB VBSS (A-830–0395) course. The 
course consists of both classroom and laboratory instruction, and 
includes: Safety, Documentation Review, Vessel Inspection (Cargo and 
Personnel), Identification and Management of Threats and Hazards, 
Evidence and Intelligence Information Collection and Documentation 
(Chain of Custody), Training Management, Collection of Biometrics, 
Management of Emergency Medical Incidents and Boarding Team 
Decontamination Procedures, Mission Planning, and New Technology in 
support of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). Graduates also 
receive instruction on UN resolutions, pre-boarding procedures to 
include vessel queries and threat profiles, compliant and non-compliant 
boarding procedures, construction and submission of an After Action 
Report (AAR), and procedures for health and comfort inspections. This 




The Mechanical Breacher Technician course includes practical 
applications used currently by U.S. Navy SPECWAR and Non-
Compliant Visit Board Search and Seizure Team Mechanical Breaches, 
as such, this course has an additional emphasis on Maritime Interdiction 
Operations, also providing practical training in breaching metal doors 
and walls, bulkheads and hatches, to wooden doors and entry ways. The 
Mechanical Breaching Technician course will provide training in the use 
of 1) Manual Breaching Tools and Techniques, 2) Mechanical Breaching 
Tools and Techniques, 3) Ballistic (Shotgun) Breaching Tools and 
Techniques and 4) Exothermic (Torch) Breaching Tools and Techniques.  
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